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“Nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning than a number of 
neighbouring and independent states connected together by commerce and policy” 
David Hume (1742/1985: 119) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Why is it that the arts and sciences rose to such early and lasting heights in what is called 
“Western civilisation”? Why have schools, universities, academies emerged and progressed in 
various parts of Europe – and with them democracy, commerce, and the rule of law? David 
Hume was amongst the first to ask that question and provide an answer that relates to “mutual 
jealousy” between “neighbouring states” that are “connected together by commerce and 
policy” (Hume 1742/1985: 119). Greek antiquity provides an early example:  
 
“Greece was a cluster of little principalities which soon became republics … Each city 
produced its several artists and philosophers … Their contention and debates 
sharpened the wits of men. A variety of objects was presented to the judgement, while 
each challenged the preference to the rest, and the sciences, not being dwarfed by the 
restraint of authority, were enabled to make such considerable shoots as are even at 
this time the objects of our admiration” (ibid.: 120f.). 
 
According to this account two elements seem to have been most favourable to “sharpened 
wits of men” or, for that matter, learning: variety and liberty
1. One could even attribute the 
“sharpened wits” to only one causal factor that combines variety and liberty: competition. 
Competition as the peaceful rivalry and free mobility between a variety of free producers of 
arts, ideas, crafts, services, commodities, but also of laws, institutions and policies can be said 
to be a most distinctive heritage of European or (later) “Western” civilisation and has been 
argued to be a major explanation of “How the West Grew Rich” (Rosenberg/Birdzell 1986). 
Being neither historian nor anthropologist, I have to abstract from many aspects of history and 
“culture” in a wider sense (including habits, traditions, tastes, informal norms, values, arts and 
sciences). Rather, I will concentrate on favourable conditions for “political learning” in the 
sense of learning about the qualities of alternative potential legal-political solutions to 
                                                 
1 Many other classical authors have noted the peculiar relationships between variety (political decentralization) 
and liberty in “old Europe” from Greek antiquity until the advent of nationalism during the 19
th century. A 
recurrent account sees Europe’s geography as a primary condition that allowed only small and medium-sized 
jurisdictions to endure. Limited size coincided with limited government mainly because of the necessity to 
engage in inter-jurisdictional trade and market-friendly policies in order to attract fairs and merchants, but also 
artists and scholars who would find a variety of attractive neighbouring locations for employing their talents. 
Thus liberty may historically have been a by-product of competing variety which, in turn, was necessitated by 
geography. Roland Vaubel (2008) in his survey of the history of thought on institutional competition, refers to 
Hume, Montesquieu, Kant, Smith, Gibbon, Tocqueville, Acton, to substantiate this claim. Amongst present day 
scholars Jones (1981), North (1981), Berman (1983), Rosenberg/Birdzell (1986), Landes (1998), Volckart 
(2000), or Nemo (2005) point at very similar interrelations.   3
present-day social problems. And I will argue that competition between institutions (more 
specifically: between jurisdictions) provides, by ways of peaceful rivalry, an unequalled 
opportunity for learning about momentarily comparatively more adequate potential solutions 
to political-social problems. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: In part 2, I will discuss the ability of economic theories of 
competition to take the very phenomenon of learning into account. Neoclassical mainstream 
theories are able to address many aspects of competition (above all: static efficiency), but 
creative learning is mostly out of its reach. Therefore, I will turn to Austrian, especially 
Hayekian, views of “competition as a discovery procedure” in order to show important links 
between competition and learning. In part 3, I will lay out a first set of important peculiarities 
of institutional competition amongst jurisdictions. In a spirit of “consequent fallibilism” I will 
characterise institutions as hypotheses that always have to prove their adequacy in view of 
changing problem situations. Only based on this crucial assumption does learning by ways of 
trial and error become an important aspect of political life. Unlike in the realm of economic 
competition, institutions, however, appear on two distinct levels: not only as rules of the game 
that channel individual and collective choices within rules, but also as objects of individual 
choices of rules by ways of “exit”. In part 4, I will sketch the feedback-mechanisms between 
individual choices of institutions or “institutional arbitrage” on the “demand-“side, and 
collective choices of rules or “institutional entrepreneurship” on the “supply-“side. The 
capabilities of institutional competition to trigger learning processes in politics are discussed 
in part 5. Here, a major argument will be that “parallel experimentation” offers greater hope 
and scope for evolutionary learning than “consecutive experimentation”. In part 6, I want to 
highlight the virtues of institutional competition as a discovery procedure by comparing it to 
realistic alternatives (isolation, harmonisation and centralisation). Part 7 provides a short 
outlook with reference to the future of European integration. 
 
2.  Competition as a discovery procedure and learning opportunity 
 
The mainstream neoclassical approach to competition and other social phenomena can be 
condensed in one sentence as: “the combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market 
equilibrium and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly” (Becker 1976: 5). 
Such relentless combinations imply another assumption: “given knowledge”. And by 
assuming “given knowledge” or “common knowledge” the phenomenon of learning is   4
excluded from the area of investigation right from the start. To be sure, with the advent of the 
economics of information (e.g. Stigler 1961, Stiglitz 2000) “perfect information” no longer 
serves as a necessary companion to neoclassical economics. Imperfect and/or asymmetric 
information can be combined with stable preferences and maximising behaviour and still 
yield market equilibria. Learning in the sense of coping with true uncertainty and facing the 
potential of error and novelty, however, is something other than optimising ignorance based 
on given knowledge
2. Still, even imperfect information based on “rational ignorance” leads 
neoclassical price-theory to imply “imperfect competition” and various forms of “market 
failure”. The ideal of welfare economics – “perfect competition” – demands that 
homogeneous goods are given and knowledge about their properties is complete. Competition 
thus seems to be efficient and welfare-enhancing only in the economist’s Nirvana where there 
is nothing left to learn. 
 
“Austrian” or evolutionary approaches are characterised by a more or less relentless rejection 
of Becker’s view. Maximising representative agents are rejected in favour of bounded rational 
individuals who differ in their knowledge, skills, expectations, practices and learning 
heuristics. Expectations and practices can even be wholly mistaken. Static equilibrium is 
rejected in favour of a process-analysis of spontaneous orders characterised by endogenous 
change based on the permanent creation of novelty, the competitive selection and the (often 
path-dependent) emulation of potential problem solutions which are not “given data” but 
changing options to be discovered in the process of competition. And with the emergence of 
novelty, endogenous change and interactive learning, stable preferences become a much more 
critical assumption that can hardly serve as an adequate starting point in many cases that are 
of interest – such as the case of learning. 
 
It is above all with Hayek that a new view of the relation between “Economics and 
Knowledge” (Hayek 1937/48) emerged that centred on the phenomenon of a “division of 
knowledge” as “the really central problem of economics as a social science” (ibid.: 50). 
Economic agents are now assumed to base their individual plans on subjective expectations 
that reflect personal skills and local, partial knowledge which in its totality can never be 
known to any single mind. Economic coordination therefore takes place between individuals 
whose expectations about the behaviour of others are necessarily speculative, different and 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Knudsen (1993) or Wohlgemuth (2005: 31ff.) for a critique of the optimizing calculus of “rational 
ignorance” based on marginal costs and benefits of an investment in new knowledge – the value of which can by 
its very nature not be known ex ante.   5
fallible, since they are based on only partial and conjectural knowledge about the social 
environment. Individuals always have to adapt to new circumstances that are permanently 
changed by processes of trial and error. In other words: social interaction involves permanent 
learning about new, subjective and ephemeral social “facts”.  
 
“The use of knowledge in society” (Hayek 1945/48) thus is not to be seen as a learning-
process in the sense of an increasing stock of “scientific” knowledge about historical facts or 
universal nomological relations of cause and effect. The knowledge relevant here “never 
exists in concentrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess” (ibid.: 77). With the 
division of knowledge a form of social learning becomes important that consists of 
innumerable actors’ successful adaptation to changing circumstances by ways of using 
knowledge that others have and that they themselves do not have to understand. Hayek’s 
prime example for such a somewhat “free-riding” use of knowledge is the price system as a 
“system of telecommunications” or “signals” (ibid.: 87) that allows market actors to adjust 
their subjective plans to a myriad of changes in the economic environment that affect the 




“The meaning of competition” (Hayek 1946/48), in this context of a division of knowledge 
and its social use through price-signals, in important respects becomes the exact opposite of 
the neoclassical view of “perfect competition” based on “given” circumstances. If one could 
in fact treat preferences, knowledge and homogeneous goods as given “data”, competition 
would indeed become meaningless.
4 The true meaning of competition is that of “a process of 
the formation of opinion … It creates the views that people have about what is best and 
cheapest, and it is because of it that people know at least as much about possibilities and 
opportunities as they in fact do. It is thus a process which involves a continuous change in the 
data and whose significance must therefore be completely missed by any theory that treats 
these data as constant” (ibid.: 106). 
                                                 
3 See also Lachmann (1956: 21f) on the role of changes in relative prices which assist individual learning about 
new circumstances: “by observing price changes consumers learn which goods to substitute for which, and 
producers learn which line of production to abandon and which to turn to … We may regard the price system as 
a vast network of communication through which knowledge is at once transmitted from each market to the 
remotest corners in the economy.” 
4 Hayek later made the even more drastic point that: „if anyone really knew all about what economic theory calls 
the data, competition would indeed be a very wasteful method of securing adjustment to these data” (Hayek 
1968/78: 179)   6
 
“Competition as a discovery procedure” (Hayek 1968/78) thus implies that “wherever the use 
of competition can be rationally justified, it is on the ground that we do not know in advance 
the facts that determine the actions of competitors … it would clearly be pointless to arrange 
for competition, if we were certain beforehand who would do best” (ibid: 179). Thus, the need 
to learn is the main justification for competition. And enhanced learning is the main outcome 
of competition “as a procedure for the discovery of such facts as, without resort to it, would 
not be known to anyone, or at least would not be utilised” (ibid.). 
 
For my purpose of analysing the possibility of “learning through institutional competition” a  
general assessment of competition is needed, very much like the one that Hayek portrays as 
“competition as a discovery procedure”. Such a general view would not have to be limited to 
the case of market competition and the price system, which are only parts of the overall 
process of institutional competition (see below). As major elements of an evolutionary view 
of competition as a process of discovery and social learning one needs only a few assumptions 
about individual behaviour and social life – which fortunately are much more realistic than 
those commonly used in mainstream economics. In addition, these assumptions hold for 
social behaviour in general – for economic as well as political rivalry and coordination.
5 
 
(1) Individual behaviour: Human action, on markets as well as in politics or elsewhere outside 
the realm of irrational exuberance, metaphysical trance, or lovelorn remorse, is based on 
purposeful theory-guided expectations. The purpose is to achieve one’s own chosen ends 
(satisfy preferences) which may also include a purposeful regard for the welfare of others. 
Knowledge about the best way to achieve these ends is based on conjectures and beliefs 
(theories). These conjectures can be mistaken, they take the form of fallible hypotheses.
6  
(2) Social context: If human action takes place in a competitive environment, the ability to 
achieve one’s own chosen ends depends on the reactions of others. These “others” are (a) 
those who voluntarily prefer one’s offered problem-solutions to alternative suggestions 
made by (b) competing providers of potential problem-solutions.  
 
                                                 
5 In other words, one does not have to use “bifurcated man” assumptions that would imply that someone who 
enters the political field would display standards of behaviour that differ from those she uses in economic 
transactions (see Buchanan 1972 on the methodological inconsistency of using “bifurcated man” assumptions). 
6 See Boulding (1956), Vanberg/Buchanan (1989), or Wohlgemuth (2002), for a more thorough account of the 
methodological consequences of adding to preferences (goals, tastes: “what one wants”) theories and beliefs 
about the world and about how to achieve these goals (“what one believes”).   7
Competition, thus, is a permanent process of trying to persuade others to voluntarily prefer 
one’s own proposed problem-solutions to those of others. It is not a state of rest or 
“equilibrium”, nor can it be based on objective “maximising behaviour”, because which and 
whose hypotheses will prove to be momentarily “right” and socially rewarded, changes and 
can not be known ex ante. It emerges from the process of voluntary interaction with likewise 
uncertain partners and “un-given” environments and thus cannot inform the same inter-
personal process in a hypothetical state of given antecedents. If all facts that price-theory 
assumes to be given and known were in fact given and known, competition would indeed be a 
most superfluous and wasteful method of securing adjustment to these “given” facts. Only if 
there is no permanent and pre-known “truth”, only if there is something to discover and 
something new to learn, does competition make social sense. And since one can have no ex-
ante preference for something that one can only aspire to discover and learn, even the 
comfortable assumption of “given preferences” becomes unsuited for an assessment of the 
relationship between competition and learning. In short, the mainstream approach based on 
“the combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium and stable 
preferences” (Becker, op. cit.) may have many advantages. But as a starting-point for 
exploring “learning through competition” it does not allow us to account for learning 
processes as they unfold in real life. 
 
3.  Institutions as objects of individual choice and as rule of the game 
 
Similar statements about the inadequacy of neoclassical economics to account for 
evolutionary properties of market competition have often been made. In addition to the 
Hayekian insight of the use of (more or less given) dispersed subjective knowledge, 
(Schumpeterian) creative entrepreneurship needs to be added to those elements that the 
neoclassical mainstream is ill-equipped to deal with. Both elements: the discovery of 
dispersed knowledge and the creation of new knowledge are, of course, central elements of 
any theory of learning. Learning involves both the discovery and communication of facts and 
theories that are “better” and the creation of ideas that may turn out to be “better”. The 
criterion for “better” or “worse” is rather easily identified in the realm of individual voluntary 
transactions on the market place: the customer is “king” – whatever he “buys” according to 
her “consumer’s sovereignty” is “better” according to his theories about what best satisfies 
her needs. Market competition based on un-coerced choices and entrepreneurial creations 
produces both the spontaneous adaptation to variety (of preferences, opinions, capabilities   8
etc.) and the spontaneous creation of variety (new potential problem-solutions for new 
potential needs). Both are prerequisites for learning. 
 
There are important differences between typical market competition and inter-jurisdictional 
competition, to which I will turn in the next section. Still, institutional competition can be, 
quite like market competition, reconstructed as a “discovery procedure” and unique occasion 
for social learning processes. I define “institutions” for the purpose of the present task as rules 
of behaviour that are enforced by various sanctioning-mechanisms within a given group of 
people. In the process of competition between (realms and suppliers of) institutions, such 
rules relate to two different levels: (a) as objects of individual or collective (political) choice 
and (b) as rules of the game defining legitimate procedures and objects of individual or 
collective (political) choices. I will return to this crucial distinction in due course. First, I want 
to stress the fallible, conjectural character not only of human action, but also of institutions as 
human creations: on both levels – as inter-jurisdictional rules of the game that define how 
jurisdictions and rules can be individually chosen and as domestic rules that might be 
individually chosen. 
 
Institutions play a crucial role in stabilising expectations of uncertain actors, thus reducing 
transaction costs and making mutual gains from trade with others more likely (e.g. North 
1990). But any collective decision about which rules in which kinds of combinations with 
existing formal and informal rules are most adequate for which groups of citizens under which 
changing conditions, is confronted with formidable knowledge-problems. Such things can 
never be completely and conclusively known – neither to an enlightened benevolent dictator 
(or: economist) nor to “the sovereign” in a democracy: the majority of citizens. Based on that 
simple, but fundamental Popperian insight, Albert (1986: 40ff) calls for a “consistent 
fallibilism” which should not only apply to scientific hypotheses, but also to political attempts 
to solve collective action problems. In terms of a procedural social technology, consequent 
fallibilism or “rational problem-solving behaviour” (ibid.) calls for competition in the sense of 
the creation and comparative evaluation of realisable proposals for the solution of social 
problems offered by various groups and political “entrepreneurs” (ibid.). This is the basic 
rationale for learning through institutional competition (see part 5). 
 
But which kinds of proposals can be effectively, legally, realised and which criteria for their 
evaluation and final implementation should be applied, depends on the rules of the game of   9
collective decision-making. Very much in the way that workable competition in the realm of 
economics (or of science) depends on the general acceptance of procedural rules of conduct, 
the workability and effectiveness of institutional competition as a learning device depends on 
the rules of the game. Of course, these institutions on a procedural level, as rules of the game 
of inter-jurisdictional competition or of an inter-jurisdictional “Wettbewerbsordnung”, are just 
as conjectural and fallible as are the intra-jurisdictional institutional hypotheses themselves. 
However, combining a constitutional economics “consent” test and some Austrian economics 
insights into the preconditions of competition as a discovery procedure, one can arrive at 
some plausible suggestions about which kinds of rules of the game of institutional 
competition would be most suited to allow for experimentation and learning in a way that 
should be in the common constitutional interest of sovereign citizens. 
 
As Hayek and others
7 have argued, both inter-personal justice and the workability of 
competition as a discovery procedure are best served under rules of the game that pass a “test 
of universalisability”. This is a procedural “test of the appropriateness of a rule” (Hayek 1976: 
27) with the main criterion for appropriateness being whether we “can ‘want’ or ‘will’ that 
such a rule be generally applied” (ibid.: 28). Applying this Kantian test to the principles of a 
legal order, Hayek (1966/67:166) distinguishes 3 essential and interrelated aspects of rules of 
just conduct: 
 
(1) The rules should refer to concrete individual and political behaviour, not to states of 
affairs that no one could intentionally have brought about.  
(2) The rules would in most cases be prohibitions aimed at the prevention of unjust action
8. 
(3) By prohibiting non-generalisable, discriminatory acts, the rules create protected domains 
that allow legally equal citizens to pursue self-chosen ends by choosing among an open 
set of actions that are not prohibited. 
 
With respect to the discussion of international governance (e.g. Rodrik 1997, Rawls 1999), 
these criteria can yield some guidance. It implies that it would be broadly pointless to discuss 
globalisation or institutional competition in terms of market results such as the distribution of 
incomes across countries or regions or “terms of trade”, as long as they are the unintended 
results of spontaneous interactions between millions of individuals, which no one could ever 
                                                 
7 See Vanberg (2006) for a systematic account of the concepts of common constitutional interests and “citizen 
sovereignty”. See also Buchanan/Congleton (1998) and Berggren (1999) on the relationship between common 
constitutional interests and the formal principle of “generality” or “universalisability”. 
8 The same is true for Kant’s famous articles on perpetual peace. All, Kant observes, “are prohibitive laws” 
requiring the abolishment of the stated abuses (Kant 1795/1991: 97).   10
have produced (or prevented) by deliberate action. Instead, one would have to look for 
concrete behaviour on the part of economic or political actors that can be argued to be unjust 
because it does not pass the test of universalisability, since no one (including those who carry 
out these acts) would want this kind of behaviour to be generally applied. Protectionism 
provides the perfect example. Tariffs and quotas, as well as cases of deliberately erected non-
tariffs barriers to trade will be ruled out by the generality test as prejudicial to the myopic 
interests of specific groups. 
 
The most important rules of just behaviour in an international community of free nations 
would have to bind political agents. They would above all consist of prohibitions of certain 
political actions that obstruct citizens’ freedom to engage in mutually beneficial trade with 
foreigners. To be sure, the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons across borders need not be the only task of an international economic order. But it 
is the foremost task, since without negative guarantees of free trade the market order is not 
going to develop into an extended abstract order that allows individuals across borders to 
pursue their self-chosen aims in a regime of mutually beneficial exchange
9. Other political 
rules that could facilitate international trade – such as the legal enforcement of border-
crossing contracts, or the introduction of international standards and norms – are clearly 
secondary to the establishment of free trade. In addition, it is far from obvious that these 
                                                 
9 In Wohlgemuth/Sideras (2004) we argue that the European Union offers both a prime example and a major 
refutation of an ideal of a competitive “interstate federalism” based on univsersalisable rules of just 
(government-) conduct, as was early envisaged by Hayek (1939/48). Already in the 1958 treaties creating the 
European Economic Community, one finds the crucial universalisable rules governing the conduct of member 
state governments: the prohibition of barriers to trade between member states and the “abolition of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons, services and capital”. Prohibitions also include member states’ granting of 
privileges in the form of aids, subsidies, discriminatory taxation and regulation. In addition, private restraints to 
trade are “prohibited as incompatible with the common market”. Hence, the freedom to act and to compete 
within the common market is protected by universalisable rules of just conduct against interference of national 
governments and of private actors. At the same time, individual member states, as long as their actions are not 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market, are free to develop institutional systems that reflect their 
own social and economic condition, cultural tradition and public opinion. This inter-jurisdictional competition 
can in fact provide, as Hayek (1939/48: 268) expected, a “salutary check” on the states’ interventionist 
endeavours while still allowing or even stimulating “desirable experimentation”. On the other side, European 
integration also clearly contradicts Hayek’s expectation that interstate federalism would discourage 
discriminatory regulation and purpose-oriented legislation. Discriminatory laws and policy prescriptions can be 
found right at the beginning of European integration (e.g. the common agricultural policy or European Coal and 
Steel Community). And they have grown ever since, demanding a “high level of protection” in health, safety, 
environmental and consumer protection policies or the establishment of redistributive funds introduced by the 
Single European Act; ambitious industrial policy targets added by the Maastricht Treaty; or a verbose declaration 
of aims and purposes in the fields of “social policy, education, vocational training and youth” added with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the present “Reform Treaty”. (see Wohlgemuth 2008).   11
elements of international private law would necessarily have to be laid down and fixed once 
and for all by an international political authority.
10  
 
4.  The processes of institutional competition 
 
Evolutionary market competition can be analysed as a compound of two interrelated 
processes, linked by feedback mechanisms, the power of which depends on the actors’ 
incentives and willingness to invest in information (Streit/Wegner 1992): a selection process 
driven by choices on the demand side and a process of rivalry between (potential) suppliers of 
alternative problem-solutions. In its general structure, this concept also describes competition 
in a democracy with voters selecting between parties and candidates and political rivals 
competing for attention and votes, triggered by gain-and-loss feedbacks, the quality of which 
depends on the information costs that the actors are willing to invest in. In their substance, 
however, economic and political processes of selection and rivalry differ considerably.
11 I will 
now discuss some differences between economic market competition and political 
competition. At the same time, I will distinguish competition for mandates in a purely 
representative democracy and inter-jurisdictional rivalry for mobile resources which combines 





In both politics and the market, the intensity of competitive selection and the prospects for 
discovery and learning during the process critically depend on the freedom of the actors on 
the demand side to choose, using their individual knowledge and pursuing their individual 
goals. And the citizens’ propensity to invest in information, to potentially “learn”, critically 
affects the intensity and quality of the selection processes. The more substitutes with differing 
                                                 
10 In fact, border-crossing transactions within the “international private law society” (Sally 2000: 111) do rely 
quite comfortably on “a web of private property rights and the enforcement of contracts according to private law 
within a multitude of separate national jurisdictions” (ibid.). International trade flourished well in the absence of 
unitary private law and of a central enforcer of international contracts. In addition to the choice of national 
formal private law and jurisdiction, informal, privately-established and enforced norms and conventions 
governing international transactions have for centuries spontaneously evolved and supported the extending order 
of global capitalism. Obviously, this unplanned evolution of an order of rules establishing “stability of 
possession, of its transference by consent and of the performance of promises” (Hume 1739/1978: 126), 
originating in the mercantile community and spreading across borders of provinces and states by imitation rather 
than deliberate design is a major vindication of Hayek’s trust in social self-organisation. 
11 See Wohlgemuth (2003) for more details. 
12 See Hirschman (1970) for the classic treatment of “exit” and “voice” as responses of citizens to a decline in 
performance of suppliers on markets and in politics.   12
price-quality combinations can be chosen according to individual preferences and needs, the 
more are actors on the demand side exposed to high-powered incentives and opportunities to 
discover these differences.  
 
With regard to these aspects, political competition most clearly fails to provide convincing 
equivalents to normal market competition. A consumer of market goods receives only the 
goods she prefers and for which he is willing to pay. A political subject receives a complete 
bundle of political goods and services, regardless of personal preferences or any reciprocal 
action. Voters for the winning coalition, voters for losing parties and non-voters equally end 
up with the same election result and have to accept the same policies. Not surprisingly 
therefore, incentives to search, store and interpret information about political offers 
(programmes, candidates), political products (laws, regulations) or political systems (rules of 
the game) are low. This lack of high-powered incentives for knowledge-creation reduces the 
ability of the political selection process to discover comparative qualities of political 
alternatives. In addition, general elections do not continuously signal citizens’ opinions on 
particular policies. They are only capable of voicing bold aggregate judgements about 
bundles of promises as incorporated in parties and candidates – and changing their relative 
political power positions every four or five years.  
 
It is here that inter-jurisdictional competition differs from purely representative democracy. 
Institutional competition is based on individual choices of jurisdictions that provide 
alternative (bundles of) rules by way of exit of mobile resources across borders
13. Exit entails 
the individual choice of rules instead of a collective choice of rulers. It is based on 
individuals’ comparative appraisals of the net benefits when combining their mobile resources 
with various existing political infrastructures in different jurisdictions. Using exit, individuals 
can free themselves to some extent from forced consumption of political goods. As an 
ongoing selection mechanism, exit is therefore much more likely to provide political 
analogues to evolutionary market competition and the discovery and use of local knowledge.  
                                                 
13 The realization of choice options by way of “exit” is not necessary for institutional competition to trigger at 
least some learning effects. Comparative performance evaluation across jurisdictions can also help to inform and 
strengthen citizens’ “voice” and thus limit monitoring and agency problems of comparatively ill-informed 
voters. Such “yardstick competition” can, even in the absence of realized “exit”, serve as a device to discipline 
rent-seeking politicians (Besley/Case 1995) and to promote policy innovation (Rincke 2005). However, 
yardstick-competition and exit-based competition should not be regarded as substitutes, but rather as 
complements that mutually reinforce each others’ thrust. The effectiveness of yardstick competition certainly 
also depends on the collective availability of exit-options and the individual decisions whether or not to use these 
exit-options is based on comparative performance evaluations of citizens who face clear incentives to invest in 
comparative institutional analysis according to their own individual “yardsticks”.   13
 
By confronting actual (and not just potential) political alternatives, institutional competition 
communicates political preferences much more concretely than general elections. It provokes 
political opinion formation focused on concrete institutional alternatives, thus leading to the 
creation and social use of political skills and knowledge in society. Compared to market 
competition, the selection processes of representative democracy are poorly equipped to 
discover individual opinions and satisfy individual preferences according to their diversity, 
intensity and variability.
14 The choice options of individuals within the process of institutional 
competition are centred somewhere between typical market competition and general elections. 
Institutions have no individual price-tags attached to them. They are not auctioned on a daily 
basis on a specific “market”. Hence the use of knowledge about institutions is not directly 
built on a division of knowledge that can be abstractly communicated by ways of changes in 
relative prices. By deciding to invest one’s capital or labour in a different jurisdiction, one is 
usually forced to choose a complete bundle of institutions for which one has to pay a more or 
less fixed overall “price”: taxes. The possibilities of “cherry picking” – choosing specific 
institutions of a foreign country while retaining others of one’s home country, are limited. 
And the possibilities of “free riding” – using foreign local public goods while not paying for 
them, should be limited.  
 
As a consequence, exit or „institutional arbitrage“ (Wohlgemuth 1995: 282ff) sends out 
abstract and often diffuse signals about the institutional preferences of owners of mobile 
resources. These signals do not directly and undisputedly tell suppliers of institutional 
frameworks how to react. The signals have to be interpreted and successful (new) strategies  




The main motivation of politicians is to acquire or retain power, prestige and income. For that 
task, institutional competition is only relevant as far as it affects a politicians’ (party’s) 
prospects for (re-)election. In the end only the home-market for votes is relevant for domestic 
politicians and thus for the supply of institutions in a democracy. But inter-jurisdictional 
                                                 
14 To be sure, these comparative shortcomings are not ‘policy failures’, but mostly the necessary consequences of 
collective action in general and of democratic decision-making under the rule of law in particular. Equality 
before the law and quality of the law both demand that laws, regulations and political favours are not 
‘exchanged’ in a market-like fashion. Such activities as one usually welcomes on markets attain negative 
connotations (favouritism, bribery) on political ‘markets’.    14
competition does affect this market in various ways: (a) the withdrawal of mobile resources 
reduces the productivity of immobile factors. Ensuing income losses of owners of (relatively) 
immobile resources can lead them to withdraw their support for the government. Especially 
the “exit” of capital investments and high-skilled labour has a negative impact on national 
income and employment  –  both crucial factors of empirically tested “popularity functions” 
of governments (e.g. Nannestad/Paldam 1994). In addition, the withdrawal of valuable 
resources as a tax-base has a negative impact on the governments’ budget and hence its ability 
to please voters with government transfers and expenditure programmes. 
 
Very much like entrepreneurs on markets for private goods, political entrepreneurs face the 
difficult task of identifying the often complex causes of their “customers’“ reactions and 
finding adequate responses. And as with competition in general, simple imitation of the 
behaviour of more successful rivals is no guarantee for success. The political entrepreneur’s 
task is even more demanding, since simple institutional emulation often creates frictions and 
inconsistencies within grown political-legal systems and traditions that display a high degree 
of functional interrelatedness. Successful political entrepreneurship would therefore very 
often not consist in imitation of one “golden” solution, but in institutional innovation, the 
creation of new problem solutions that can be more easily adapted to the specific legal-
political structures and socio-political needs of the jurisdiction to which they should apply 
(see also Mukand/Rodrik 2005). 
 
Market competition based on un-coerced choices and entrepreneurial creations enhances both 
the  adaptation to variety (of preferences, opinions, capabilities etc.) and the creation of 
variety (new potential problem-solutions for new potential needs). The same is true for 
institutional competition. And this is a major reason why models of institutional competition 
that are based on strict neoclassical equilibrium assumptions, are inadequate to account for 
innovation and learning as major advantages of inter-jurisdictional competition. In Charles 
Tiebout’s (1956) famous model, only the adaptation to given alternatives is discussed. Here 
“exit” leads, under strong assumptions (e.g. perfect information), to an efficient allocation of 
given local public goods, because citizens with heterogeneous preferences move to 
jurisdictions that best fit their given preferences. Competition between jurisdictions thus 
results in homogeneous communities, with residents who all value public services similarly. 
In this sorting equilibrium, no individual can be made better off by moving, and the market is 
efficient. The “supply” of policies remains constant, only the mobile constituency re-allocates   15
itself efficiently. Other neoclassical models that look at the reactions of political suppliers to 
the threat of exit also assume given and known alternatives and given and known knowledge 
about their attributes. Depending above all on the initial assumptions, a “race to the bottom” 
or “race to the top”, ending in an equilibrium of “ex-post” harmonisation of policies across 
jurisdictions is deduced and compared to given “ex-ante” states of affairs or ideal states. 
Again, these models are not without merit. But they are unsuited for the purpose of discussing 
learning through (institutional or any other kind of) competition
15. 
 
5.  Learning through institutional competition 
 
Above, I have introduced the notion of institutions as fallible hypotheses concerning ways to 
secure beneficial coordination and control in human interaction. Critical-rational learning 
depends on continuously challenging (falsifying) “given” theories by creating alternative 
hypotheses. In some respects, the need for the creation of variety is even greater with what 
one could call “institutional fallibilism” than in the realm of critical-rational science. 
Nomological scientific theories mostly claim universal validity and falsifiability independent 
of time and place. Political “theories” – ideas about which policies are most adequate to solve 
collective action problems – are much more contingent. They can hardly be “true” once and 
for all. Thus, political learning is not about finding one eternal and universal “truth”, but 
about discovering temporarily more suitable solutions to changing problems of groups with 
different preferences and capabilities. And it is here that variety becomes especially 
important:  “Only when a great many different ways of doing things can be tried will there 
exist such a variety of individual experiences, knowledge and skills, that a continuous 
selection of the most successful will lead to steady improvement” (Hayek 1978: 149). 
Political entities quite naturally fail to support variety on the level of goods and services 
provided. This is not by itself to be decried as “policy failure” since the tasks of the protective 
state (rule of law) and most tasks of the productive state (provision of public goods) require 
quite some intra-jurisdictional uniformity when it comes their application and enforcement. 
Most political goods and services are valuable precisely by virtue of their being the same for 
all citizens within a jurisdiction and their being changed only discontinuously.  
 
At the same time, the variety of trials, together with an effective selection of errors are 
necessary conditions for the discovery of problem-solutions that are regarded superior by their 
                                                 
15 See below and Wohlgemuth (1995) for further details.   16
users. Democracy does introduce variety, but mainly on the level of proposals rather than that 
of final products (laws, regulations). This restriction of the realm of actual competition limits 
the evolutionary potential of political competition within a jurisdiction, because in each 
jurisdiction or ‘natural’ monopoly of government, there is only one set of political problem-
solutions being tested at a time. Political evolution within these bounds is basically limited to 
learning from consecutive trials and errors (Vanberg 1993: 15f). By introducing “potential 
competition” from non-incumbents, democracy does create a variety of ideas and 
contestability of the status quo. But potential rivals make no actual contribution to an ongoing 
process of effective trial and error, and hence to a process of knowledge-creation based on 
actual comparative performance.
16 In this context inter-jurisdictional competition displays its 
major virtue as a “discovery procedure”. By enabling citizens to actively choose between 
concrete sets of political alternatives institutional competition triggers a politically effective 
form of parallel rather than of consecutive learning from real-life experiences.  
 
Our lack of knowledge about the respective working properties of policies and institutions and 
the increasing depreciation of our knowledge in the face of changing environments is thus the 
prime argument in favour of inter-jurisdictional competition (and not, as our neoclassical 
friends tend to argue: a prime argument against it). If all the problem-solving qualities of 
institutions and policies were known once and for all, institutional competition could justly be 
regarded as a wasteful (transaction-cost laden) method of discovering what we (as economists 
or politicians) claim to know already. This critique applies to neoclassical opponents and to 
defenders of institutional competition. Both presume to know the equilibrium outcome based 
on models with given preferences, given alternatives and given knowledge. In the first class 
of mechanistic models inefficient solutions crowd out the given efficient one(s) (“race to the 
bottom”); in the second the one known optimal solution is finally selected. Both models come 
close to our perfect competition stationary equilibrium model; often the only difference is that 
in the first case one starts with a perfect set of institutions and omniscient benevolent 
dictators, in the second, one usually assumes a rotten and corrupt Leviathan
17. But in both 
                                                 
16 This argument is neglected by neoclassical models of both ‘contestable markets’ (e.g. Baumol 1982) in 
industrial economics and ‘efficient political markets’ in the Chicago Public Choice literature (e.g. Wittman 1995: 
23). Both claim that ‘potential competition’ or the threat of entry can lead to results that are exactly equivalent to 
those to be expected under polypolistic competition – which is true (only) based on the models’ assumptions 
which exclude learning processes by treating all knowledge about alternatives as given. 
17 For models that show a “race to the bottom” from the peaks of benevolent omniscient governments see e.g. 
Hans-Werner Sinn (2003) and the critique provided by Vaubel (2008). For a “Leviathan”-assumption based 
argumentation, see e.g. Stefan Sinn (1992).   17
cases the competitive process has no meaning as a discovery procedure nor as a permanent 
incentive structure to trigger learning and innovation.  
 
Again, institutional competition is above all a most useful procedure if we acknowledge 
politicians’ and citizens’ constitutional lack of knowledge concerning present and future 
social problems and adequate political responses. In addition, decentralisation and inter-
jurisdictional competition are the only ways to account for the fact that citizens have different 
and changing preferences also concerning the institutions and policies that they will have to 
finance and endure. Institutional competition is no equaliser or “ex post harmoniser”. It is a 
permanent process of creating, comparing and adopting different responses to different needs, 
capabilities, and preferences.  
 
Such political learning processes naturally take time, and they need time in order to be based 
on analytical insight and emerging political consent. Instantaneous adaptation and perfect 
mobility are elements of a misleading “perfect competition” Nirvana. Gradual adaptation and 
“loyalty”-based inhibitions of immediate “exit” are not to be deplored as indicators of 
“imperfect competition”; they rather serve as necessary implications and even preconditions 
of a workable discovery and learning process in society. As already Hayek (1946/48: 103) 
observed: “slow adaptation does by no means necessarily mean weak competition. When the 
variety of near-substitutes is great and rapidly changing, where it takes a long time to find out 
about the relative merits of the available alternatives … the adjustment must be slow even if 
competition is strong and active … competition is the more important the more complex or 
‘imperfect’ are the objective conditions in which it has to operate”. In a very similar vein 
Hirschman (1970: 85) argued that a certain amount of „loyalty“ helps to find the right   
responses to decline in firms, organizations and states, since it gives entrepreneurs (on 
markets as well as in politics) time to analyse the situation and convince citizens of the need 
for political reforms.  
 
Especially with regard to responses to decline in states, the exit-signals have to be interpreted, 
and “voice” or public opinion, exploring reasons for decline and acceptable responses to it, 
has to be collectively formed and communicated. Since “voice” remains the decisive currency 
in democratic policies both extremely sensitive and instantaneous “exit” and extremely 
acquiescent “loyalty” (the relinquishment of exit-options) would obstruct critical collective 
learning processes: Extreme “exit” would lead to the sudden collapse of the community and   18
leave no dissenting voice behind; extreme “loyalty” would lead to paralysis of the community 
with no credible threat of “exit” to lead to political responses. Workable learning processes, in 
political as well as in economic organisations, are most likely to exist in situations where 
moderately loyal citizens can credibly threaten to “exit” if their “voice” is not heard.
18 
 
6.  Institutional competition and its alternatives 
 
In order to appraise the virtues of inter-jurisdictional competition, the adequate basis of 
comparison is not a state of affairs that can nowhere be realised. Instead of such a “Nirvana 
approach”, the adequate basis of comparison ought to be the consequences that would arise in 
the absence of competition (Hayek 1946/48: 100). Realistic alternatives to institutional 
competition are of two kinds:  
 
(1) Unilateral measures of local governments to prevent the ”exit” of their citizens   
(2) Multilateral collusion to prevent competition by ways of harmonisation or centralisation.  
 
Both the unilateral erection of artificial barriers to exit (or entry) and the multilateral 
cartelisation of would-be competitors, have similarly negative effects on potential discovery 
and learning in politics. Inside the isolated jurisdiction as well as among harmonised or 
centralised jurisdictions, all we can hope for and learn from are consecutive trials and errors. 
Institutional competition adds the very important dimension of parallel experimentation: the 
opportunity to compare and choose among real-world political trials
19. As a consequence, 
only institutional competition allows for the continuous discovery and communication of 
citizens’ changing preferences and needs and the continuous reflection of local differences 
between informed preferences and tested capabilities.  
 
At the same time, decentralisation and inter-jurisdictional competition are less risky ways to 
correct unavoidable errors. Inadequate harmonised or centralised policies are already less 
                                                 
18 Such conditions seem to be particularly well developed in Switzerland, with low legal barriers to exit to 
neighbouring Cantons in a highly decentralised federal system, combined with a system of direct democracy on 
the Canton-level which creates a substantial potential for citizens’ loyalty and responsibility (see 
Adamovich/Wohlgemuth 1999). 
19 Solely in terms of variety, centralization and harmonisation are even more damaging to political learning than 
isolationism since the latter does not by itself reduce variety and hence the potential of “yardstick competition” 
based on empirical observations of comparative success or failure. In terms of liberty (our second major 
component of competition, see above) however, harmonization seems to be in most cases a less drastic 
infringement. It does not curtail the freedom to move and choose as such, it “only” reduces the alternatives from 
which one can choose.   19
easily identified due to the lack of comparable and selectable alternatives. Presumably this is 
rather often what inter-jurisdictional cartels had in mind in the first place. But even generally 
recognised fatal errors of harmonised or centralised policies are very hard to revise due to the 
complex log-rolling arrangements that created many internationally agreed, but obviously 
non-universalisable and collectively damaging policies (e.g. the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy).  
 
By comparison, a system of competing jurisdictions greatly improves both citizens’ and 
politicians’ knowledge base and their incentives to react to revealed shortcomings of present 
policies. The effects in terms of risk-control are obvious: with local experimentation on 
smaller scales the refutation of a social-political “hypothesis” is no fatal disaster. But if a 
large encompassing political union is forced to follow one grand idea or all-embracing 
political theory, its refutation or falsification implies large social costs or even catastrophe. 
The holistic social experiment of communism is a radical illustration of this point.  
 
One does not have to refer to the end of history or the fate of most communist and many other 
totalitarian systems to demonstrate the merits of inter-jurisdictional competition. One can 
even admit that in many cases there are respectable arguments in favour of harmonisation. As 
an example, harmonised product norms can help reduce transaction costs and this, viewed in 
isolation, can foster efficiency and competition on product markets. Or quite generally one 
may prefer to forgo some potentials for competitive discovery on a higher level (say, by 
accepting common basic rules of the game of an internal market), if one can thus create more 
intensive competition on lower levels. Such arguments have been widely discussed in the 
classical anti-trust literature e.g. regarding standardisation cartels (e.g. Farrell/Saloner 1985; 
Blankart/Knieps 1993). The main problem is how to determine the trade-off between concrete 
and tangible advantages of some harmonisation from a static point of view (that is, the 
efficiency of given, present policies due to, e.g. economies of scale) on the one hand and a 
reduced potential for competitive discovery on the other. The tangible advantages are more 
easily modelled (which may be why mainstream economists like them), and they are more 
easily communicated (which may be why politicians like them).  
 
What is less easily modelled and sold to the public is the inherent danger of standardised 
“one-size-fits-all” policies creating institutional path-dependencies that make a spontaneous 
adaptation to new environments, new preferences and new knowledge much more difficult   20
than it would be in the presence of freedom to develop and choose alternative policies. To be 
sure, institutional competition could also lead to a reduction of institutional variety. But there 
are two crucial differences between such unplanned (ex-post) harmonisation and deliberately 
arranged (ex-ante) harmonisation: First, ex-post harmonisation through competitive selection 
is the result of voluntary decisions of citizens whereas ex-ante harmonisation is often the 
result of barter and collusion between politicians holding coercive power. Second, ex-post 
harmonisation through voluntary and revocable choices leaves the option for decentralised 
units to (re-)introduce (new) political alternatives if they so wish, whereas ex-ante 
harmonisation by political compact does not. The costs and benefits of upholding such 
“potential competition” as well as those of its deliberate destruction, however, cannot be 
specified in much detail. This would presuppose that we already knew what we can only hope 
to learn through institutional competition. 
 
7.  Outlook: how far is Brussels from Athens? 
 
Let me return to the opening quotation in which David Hume refers to the rivalry between 
Greek principalities and republics and argues that “nothing is more favourable to the rise of 
politeness and learning than a number of neighbouring and independent states connected 
together by commerce and policy”. Hume (1742/1985: 121) went on to claim that “Europe is 
at present a copy at large of what Greece was formerly a pattern in miniature”. More than 250 
years after Hume wrote this down, Europe certainly looks very different. She saw the 
emergence of large nation-states often engaged in non-peaceful rivalry with disastrous results. 
With the advent of the European Community and the European Union, peace on the continent 
has been restored and more and more nation states were (once again) to be “connected 
together by commerce and policy”. This is no minor achievement, to say the least.  
 
At the same time however, the political integration of Europe seems more and more to 
legislate away the richness of the European institutional landscape and the potential for 
learning and innovation that was once the secret of Europe’s dynamic growth of civilisation. 
With an “acquis communautaire” of over 90 000 pages of unified laws and regulations, and 
incessant demands by EU organisations and member state governments for “European 
solutions” – that is, centralised or harmonised institutional responses to social-economic 
problems – there is an imminent danger of the European Union degenerating into a political 
cartel for defending a European “social model” that nowhere exists as a common heritage and   21
that – in its variant as an overburdened welfare-state – has long lost competitive sustainability. 
Such a “model” or “European solution” could easily become a monolithic set of sclerotic 
institutions that politicians would like to protect. But institutional competition does not stop at 
the borders of the EU. If it is true that institutional variety and “mutual jealousy” were major 
causes of the “European miracle” (Jones 1981), present trends towards uniformity within the 
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